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Pie-cutting is different from cake-cutting.  For one thing, a cake is usually 
rectangular, a pie circular.  Cutting a cake into n ≥ 2 pieces typically involves making n–1 
parallel, vertical cuts across the cake, whereas cutting a pie usually means cutting wedge-
shaped pieces from the center, which requires n cuts.  We can think of a cake as being 
obtained from a pie by making some initial cut, which determines the two ends of the 
cake, so its remaining division requires only n–1 additional cuts.  It is the initial cut that 
essentially differentiates pie-cutting from cake-cutting. 
We focus on pie-cutting here, although we return to cake-cutting to compare it 
with pie-cutting.  We restrict our analysis to two players, because the properties we 
impose on the allocation of pie pieces are demanding and cannot all be satisfied if there 
are three or more players.   
Assumption and Properties 
We assume that the two players, player 1 and player 2, wish to divide a pie into 
two pieces, using two cuts from the center, with one piece allocated to each player.  
Before stating the properties that we want the allocation to satisfy, it is helpful to provide 
some mathematical formalism.  
  We assume that the cuts of the pie are radial, so the pie is mathematically 
equivalent to a circle.  Player 1 and player 2 use additive measures m1 and m2, 
respectively, to assess the value of a piece of pie. These measures are nonatomic (any 
piece of pie of positive measure is divisible into two pieces, each of positive measure, 
and therefore any single point of pie has measure 0) and absolutely continuous with 
respect to each other (any piece of pie that has measure 0 according to one player’s 
measure has measure 0 according to the other player’s measure). We lose no generality   3 
by assuming that any interval on the circle of positive length has positive measure 
because, if this were not so, we could eliminate this interval, join its endpoints, and 
redefine the measures on this new circle.  We also assume that each player assigns 
measure 1 to the whole pie. 
We wish an allocation of the pie to have three natural properties: 
•  be envy-free, that is, neither player prefers the other player’s piece to his or 
her own piece; 
•  be undominated, that is, no other allocation gives one player more, and the 
other player at least as much, value in their own eyes; and  
•  be equitable, meaning both players assign exactly the same value to the pieces 
they receive, so neither player envies the other’s “degree of happiness”—that 
is, thinks the other player did better in his or her own eyes than one did in 
one’s own eyes. 
Barbanel, Brams, and Stromquist [3] showed there always exists an allocation that is 
envy-free, undominated, and equitable when there are two players, but this is not true for 
more than two players.  No algorithm for obtaining such an allocation was given 
however; in fact, it was an open question whether or not there is a “moving-knife 
procedure” (we illustrate such procedures later) that produces such an allocation.  
Approximate Pie-Cutting: the gap procedure 
In this section we describe a moving-knife procedure that is approximate, in a 
sense to be made precise, whereas in the next section we show how it can be made exact 
given additional assumptions.  The approximate procedure gives an allocation that is envy-  4 
free, as close to undominated as desired, and as close to equitable as desired.  To make 
these notions precise, fix ε > 0, which will bound (in a way that we specify) the degree to 
which our allocation may fall short of being undominated and equitable.  
Let <A,B> denote an allocation of the pie, A to player 1 and B to player 2.  Then 
<A,B> is  
(i)  ε-undominated iff for no allocation <A',B'> is it true that m1(A)+ε < m1(A') and 
m2(B)+ε < m2(B'). 
(ii) ε-equitable iff |m1(A)–m2(B)| < ε. 
In other words, (i) there is no other allocation that is better for both players by ε or more; 
and (ii) the valuations of the players are within ε.  We next describe a procedure that 
produces an allocation that is ε-undominated and ε-equitable, provided both players are 
truthful.  Furthermore, no truthful player will envy the other player, whereas an untruthful 
player may be envious. 
The procedure 
Choose an even positive integer k so that 1/k < ε.  A referee holds a radial knife at 
some arbitrarily chosen position on the circle and slowly moves the knife clockwise 
around the circle.  Meanwhile, the two players each move k–1 knives around the circle in 
such a way that these knives, together with the referee’s knife, partition the pie into k 
pieces that, according to each player’s measure, are of equal value. 
Assume, for now, that the players’ placements of their knives accurately reflect 
their valuations.  Later we consider what happens if a player lies.  For each position of   5 
the referee’s knife, this knife—together with the k–1 knives of each player— determine 
two partitions of the pie into k pieces.   
We require that the movement of the players’ knives be consistent: Assume that 
when the referee’s knife is at position p, one player’s k–1 knives are at positions p1, p2, 
…, pk-1(going clockwise from p).  Then, when the referee’s knife moves to position p1, 
this player’s knives (again going clockwise, this time from p1) are at positions p2, p3, …, 
pk-1, p.  Note that while a player’s truthfulness cannot be observed by the referee, his or 
her consistency can be. 
We assume that each player cannot see the other player’s moving knives.  For 
example, the players may go through this procedure separately, or be screened from 
seeing the other player’s knives.  As the players move their knives, the referee makes a 
movie of the players’ movements so as to show the two sets of knives moving 
simultaneously. 
  For any integer i, and for each of the two players, we refer to that player’s 
clockwise i-piece or counterclockwise i-piece of pie, counting from the referee’s knife 
clockwise or counterclockwise, respectively, to that player’s knife i.  At each point in the 
process, there is either an overlap or a gap between these i-pieces.  (If they meet at a 
point, we consider this a gap, since a single point has measure zero.) 
First, let i = k/2 (and recall that k is even, so i is an integer).  As the referee’s knife 
moves clockwise, we observe player 1’s clockwise i-piece and player 2’s 
counterclockwise i-piece.  (Since we are presently assuming that the players are truthful, 
each player values his or her i-piece at i/k = ½ .)  We claim that there must be some time 
in this process when there is a gap between the two players’ i-pieces.  Consider, for   6 
example, the starting position.  If there is not a gap at this time, then there is an overlap.  
It is not hard to see that when the referee’s knife moves around to any point in this initial 
overlap, there will now be a gap, and the initial position of the referee’s knife will be in 
this gap.  This follows because each measure is additive, and so the complement of any 
piece having measure ½ also has measure ½. 
  We repeat this process with i = (k/2)+1.  If there is no gap at any point in the 
referee’s 12-hour rotation, we stop.  If there is a gap, we repeat the rotation with i = 
(k/2)+2.  When finally i = k, there will be no gap at any point in the rotation, since the i = 
k rotation involves pieces with value 1, i.e., the whole pie.  Hence, for some j 
=1,2,…,(k/2), the i = (k/2)+j–1 rotation has a gap at some point, but the i = (k/2)+j 
rotation does not.  For convenience, set s = (k/2)+j–1, the last rotation showing a gap.  
We call this the s-rotation. 
  Arbitrarily choose a position  p for the referee’s knife so that there is a gap in the 
s-rotation when the referee’s knife is at position p.  We refer to this gap in the s-rotation 
as the s-gap.   
In the (s+1)-rotation, there are no gaps.  In particular, when the referee’s knife is at 
p in the (s+1)-rotation, there is an overlap between the players’ (s+1)-pieces (specifically, 
an overlap between player 1’s clockwise (s+1)-piece and player 2’s counterclockwise 
(s+1)-piece). We refer to this overlap as the (s+1)-overlap.   
Note that it is not possible for the s-gap and the (s+1)-overlap to be disjoint.  We 
illustrate this in Figure 1.  The four diagrams correspond to the four possible relative 
positions of the players’ knives s and (s+1), and the corresponding four relative positions 










Figure 1.  Arrows indicate the interval from knife s to knife (s+1) for each player.  
The s-gap is dark, and the (s+1)-overlap is grey. 
Pick a point q that is in both the s-gap and the (s+1)-overlap.  Let A be the piece 
of pie obtained by going clockwise from p to q, and let B be the complement.  We will 
show that <A,B> is the desired allocation.   
  Because A and B are each obtained by starting at the point p and going to the 
point q (clockwise for player 1, counterclockwise for player 2), and q is at or beyond each 
player’s knife s, it follows that any player who truthfully indicates the position of his or 
her knife in the s-rotation will get a piece of pie of size at least s/k.  Since j ≥ 1, it follows 
that each player receives a piece of pie whose value is at least s/k = [(k/2)+j–1]/k ≥ 
[(k/2)/k] = ½.  Therefore, if a player is truthful, he or she will not envy the other player. 
What if a player is not truthful?  Suppose, for example, that player 1 and player 2 
have identical measures, that player 1 is truthful, and that player 2 is not.  This means that 
at some time in the s-rotation, some pair of corresponding knives of the players does not 
coincide.  This, together with our consistency assumption, implies that there will be a gap 
of more than a single point at some time in the s-rotation.  If the point q is chosen from   8 
within (i.e., not at an endpoint of) this gap, player 1 will get strictly more than half the 
pie, since he or she was truthful, but because player 1 and player 2 have identical 
measures, player 2 will get strictly less than half the pie and, hence, will envy player 1. 
If both players are truthful, we prove allocation <A,B> is ε-undominated and ε-
equitable by first supposing, by way of contradiction, that <A,B> is not ε-undominated.  
Then for some allocation <A',B'>, m1(A)+ε < m1(A') and m2(B)+ε < m2(B').  Our 
construction and the players’ truthfulness imply that m1(A) ≥ s/k and m2(B) ≥ s/k.  This, 
plus the fact that (1/k) < ε, implies that  
m1(A') > m1(A)+ε ≥ (s/k)+ε > (s/k)+(1/k) = (s+1)/k.   
Similarly, m2(B') > (s+1)/k.  But this contradicts the fact that the (s+1)-rotation has no 
gaps. 
To show that <A,B> is ε-equitable, we simply observe that each player’s piece 
runs from the referee’s knife to somewhere between (but not necessarily strictly between) 
each player’s knife s and knife s+1.  Hence, if each player is truthful, then each player 
values his or her piece at between s/k and (s+1)/k.  The difference between these two 
values is at most 1/k.  Since (1/k) < ε, it follows that the allocation <A,B> is ε-equitable.   
We call this procedure the gap procedure, not to be confused with a different gap 
procedure for the fair division of both divisible and indivisible goods (Brams and Kilgour 
[7], Brams [4] gives updated references).  Because truthfulness maximizes the minimum 
(i.e., ½ the value of the cake) that a player can guarantee for himself or herself—  9 
irrespective of what the other player does— truthfulness is a maximin strategy for the gap 
procedure.  
There is nothing in our procedure that prevents there from being a gap, not chosen 
by the referee, that gives both players more value (i.e., is closer to being undominated), 
narrows the difference in their valuations (i.e., is more equitable), or both.  However, 
such a preferred allocation cannot yield both players ε or more in value, or give one 
player ε or more in value over what the other player receives.  Thus, the allocation that 
the gap procedure produces is approximately undominated and approximately equitable 
while being entirely envy-free. 
We close this section by noting that while it was convenient to present the idea of 
the procedure in stages (i.e., as a sequence of rotations), in truth the same actions are 
being performed by the referee and by the players at every stage.  The crucial stage is that 
in which there are no longer gaps, so the referee chooses a point for a second cut in the 
intersection of the s-gap and the (s+1)-overlap.    
An Exact Procedure? 
One approach to rendering the approximate allocation of the gap procedure exact 
is to allow the referee to ask for more information from the players.  In particular, assume 
that the referee begins by asking each player to report, unbeknownst to the other player, 
his or her measure.  (For now we assume that the players are truthful in their reports.  
Shortly we show that a player risks ending up envious by lying.)  
Knowing the players’ measures, the referee (R) can, in principle, find the 
maximum gap in a single 12-hour rotation of two knives.  R does so by placing one knife 
at some starting point (say, 12 o’clock), and another knife at another starting point (say, 5   10 
o’clock), that equitably divides the pie: Player 1’s valuation of the pie between 12 and 5 
is the same as player 2’s valuation between 5 and 12.  R rotates the two knives 
simultaneously clockwise (or counterclockwise), maintaining the equitable valuations of 
the two players through 12 hours, after which R determines a pair of cutpoints that 
maximize the players’ equitable valuations.  The resulting allocation is equitable (by 
construction), undominated (because it is maximal), and, necessarily, envy-free 
(equitability and undominatedness imply envy-freeness for two players).  
Suppose one player lies about his or her measure, underestimating value during 
some parts of the rotation and overestimating it during others.  This player has no 
assurance that the equitable cutpoint found by the referee gives him or her a piece whose 
value is underestimated and that he or she could not have done better by being truthful.  
In particular, a lying player has no assurance that he or she will receive a piece with value 
at least ½ the pie, and thus no assurance of not being envious of the other player. 
Only truthfulness on the part of each player maximizes the minimum that each can 
guarantee for himself or herself, and only truthfulness on the part of both players 
guarantees that the allocation is equitable, envy-free, and undominated. 
To guarantee these properties, R must continuously pay attention to both players’ 
measures to ensure that the two continuously moving cutpoints equalize the players’ 
valuations at every instant, a big task.  On the other hand, is it less demanding to ask the 
players to respond instantaneously to R’s moving knife under the gap procedure?  This 
also requires an infinite number of calculations.  
Whether one should allow a calculating R—rather than one who just moves a 
knife—is a philosophical issue more than a mathematical one.  The gap procedure   11 
requires only that the players make calculations at every point of the circle, whereas the 
exact procedure requires that a referee calculate equitable cutpoints and then find a pair 
that maximizes the players’ valuations.  In either case, the mathematical calculation 
required is clear; it is less clear which calculation should be allowed.   
To complicate matters, there is a third philosophical position: Rule out entirely 
any possibility of instantaneous calculations and continuously moving knives.  Instead, 
allow only discrete procedures and cuts at discrete times.  The argument for this position 
is the well-known definition of an algorithm as a finite procedure that a Turing machine 
can execute.  This disallows continuous, and hence infinitely many, calculations.  To be 
sure, continuous calculations can be “discretized,” but this makes them only approximate. 
Moving-knife procedures have long been part of the fair-division literature 
(Brams, Taylor, and Zwicker [9], Brams and Taylor [8], Robertson and Webb [11], 
Barbanel and Brams [2]); in our view, they should not be banned for two reasons.  One is 
that they can be used to prove the existence of an allocation with specified properties; the 
other is that such procedures are intuitively appealing, even if they presume instantaneous 
calculations.   
Existence proofs do not say how players can achieve a particular allocation but, 
instead, show only that such allocations exist (see, for example, Barbanel [1]).  
Algorithms are finite, step-by-step procedures that enable players to implement certain 
allocations, which we illustrate for cake-cutting in the next section. 
Continuous procedures involving moving knives, like the gap procedure, are not 
finite, but they enable players to implement allocations, with the help of a referee, who 
uses information that he or she can directly observe.  For example, while a referee can   12 
observe and verify that knives are moved and cuts are made according to his or her 
instructions, he or she has no access to the private information held by players and so 
cannot determine that they are acting according to their stated preferences.   
By contrast, when the players report their measures to the referee under the exact 
procedure, the referee can move their knives and make cuts as if he or she were acting for 
them. This kind of procedure has been allowed in the recent pie-cutting literature (Brams, 
Jones, and Klamler [6]).  
Relationship to Cake-Cutting 
Whether discrete or continuous, with or without a calculating referee, we insist 
that a procedure not prevent a truthful player from obtaining an allocation with specified 
properties.  We illustrate this with a discrete cake-cutting procedure, somewhat like the 
gap procedure, which gives players the incentive to be truthful about their 50-50 points 
but fails to guarantee that the resulting envy-free allocation is equitable.  Indeed, we 
conjecture that there is no two-person cake-cutting procedure—discrete or continuous—
in which truth-telling by both players is the only strategy that guarantees them an envy-
free and equitable allocation of a cake.  (All envy-free allocations of a cake are 
undominated; see Gale [10], and Barbanel, Brams, and Stromquist [3].)  
Assume that each of two players is asked to indicate, unbeknownst to the other, 
where they would make their 50-50 cut in a cake.  If these are not the same point and so 
leave a gap, begin by giving each player the side of the gap that gives him or her ½ the 
cake, as he or she values it.  This is equivalent to choosing i = k/2 with the gap procedure 
but, because this is a cake, not a pie, without the need for a referee to move a knife 
around a circle.     13 
As with pie-cutting, a player has good reason to be truthful about his or her 50-50 
point on the cake (Brams, Jones, and Klamler [5]).  If the player is not, he or she may end 
up with less than ½ cake, even adding in the entire gap.  This can be seen below, where 1 
and 2 are the true 50-50 points of players 1 and 2, respectively, and B and E are the 
beginning and end boundaries of the cake.  
B-------------1—2-----1'----------E 
If player 1 misrepresents his or her 50-50 point as 1', then giving him or her all of the gap 
plus the remainder of the right side yields the player [2,E], which he or she values at less 
than ½, whereas player 2 obtains ½ from [B,2).  
If the players are truthful about their 50-50 points, how can they divide the gap 
[1,2]?  Unlike pie-cutting, the gap procedure, applied to cake-cutting, is vulnerable to 
strategizing.  If the players are asked to cut the cake into k > 2 equal pieces instead of 
two, they have no incentive, after accurately indicating their 50-50 cutpoints, to tell the 
referee their true measures.  Instead, they should pretend to value cake near its endpoints 
at almost 50 percent each, and then very little until it reaches exactly 50 percent at their 
50-50 points.  More specifically, if a player pretends to value the cake around his or her 
50-50 point as very low, he or she will need more of the interval that separates the 50-50 
points to obtain the same value as the other player receives from it, giving both players an 
incentive to lie. 
The players’ claims would cause the interval to disappear (when j = 2), so the 
referee’s choice would be an arbitrary cutpoint in [1,2].  While this would ensure each 
player of an envy-free piece of least ½ the cake, any guarantees about equitability fall by 
the wayside.  However, Brams, Jones, and Klamler [5] provide a partial solution to this   14 
problem by giving a procedure that produces a “proportionally equitable” allocation of a 
cake.       
With pie-cutting, on the other hand, there will, in general, be an infinite number of 
gaps, which could be anywhere around the circle.  Unlike cake-cutting, the players are at 
a loss in cutting a pie to formulate a strategy of lying that can increase their shares, 
beyond what truthfulness guarantees.  To be sure, a player may do better by lying, but as 
we have demonstrated, a player also may do worse, because only truthfulness is a 
maximin strategy. 
Conclusion 
In [3], Barbanel, Brams, and Stromquist suggest that pie-cutting is harder than 
cake-cutting.  One reason is that cake allocations can have stronger properties.  For 
example, it is always possible to find an undominated, envy-free allocation of a cake, but 
there are pies for which this is not possible for three or more players.  
Ironically, for two players, pie-cutting is easier, as we have shown—at least using 
the gap or the exact procedure—because the players have no incentive to lie, lest they do 
worse.  But this is not true of cake-cutting.  Thus, envy-free, undominated, and equitable 
allocations—or at least approximations to the latter two properties—are easier to achieve 
for pies than for cakes.  
Summary 
Barbanel, Brams, and Stromquist (in 2009) asked whether there exists a two-
person moving-knife procedure that yields an envy-free, undominated, and equitable 
allocation of a pie.  We present two procedures: One yields an envy-free, almost 
undominated, and almost equitable allocation, whereas the second yields an allocation   15 
with the two “almosts” removed.  The latter, however, requires broadening the definition 
of a “procedure," which raises philosophical, as opposed to mathematical, issues.  An 
analogous approach for cakes fails because of problems in eliciting truthful preferences.     16 
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